

VIA: AIR POUCH
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. WSSA-3153

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division W

DATE: 12 October 1951

FROM : []

SUBJECT: GENERAL—

SPECIFIC— Polish-Baltic Military Secretariat

Reference: 140 CSSWU of 27 September 1951

1. [] recently told [] and [] that the British are secretly organizing a Polish-Baltic Military Secretariat in England, which is to serve as some type of General Staff for questions concerning Poland and the Baltic countries. [] The British are primarily being aided in their activities by Dr. Willibald RUAD, current chairman of the Estonian National Fund in London, and former counsellor of the Estonian Legation in London, and by General ANDERS, of Polish Army wartime fame. Each Baltic country will be represented on the Secretariat by a military and a civilian figure, and [] says that Heinrich LARETEI, former Estonian Minister to Sweden, and Colonel Alphonse RABANE are being considered as the Estonian civilian and military members of the Secretariat.

2. [] reported this information in reference, which contains considerable material on the past and current activities of LARETEI, and we are reporting this material separately since it may not have come to the attention of Headquarters and []

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FORM NO. 51-28/A
MAR 1949

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Memorandum Regarding My (C) Conversation with (C)
on November 28, 1951

Before our conversation (C) informed me that, rather recently he had a meeting regarding Lithuanian problems with a very high American official - "much higher, than the two in Munich".

(RCL)
Rose C. Lane (P)

a. (C) asked (C) for the answers to two questions:

- (1) How much could Miss Simonaitis have known about the ties with Lithuania from Sweden? (C) answered that, eventually, she could have learned that Tarvydas, in case of necessity, would return to Lithuania. Miss Simonaitis could not have learned more about their native ties from Sidzikauskas, since he himself, knew nothing more of them. However, how much she might have known about his other combinations, for example, the French, (C) would have no way of determining. There was talk all over VLIK - which (C) thinks he heard about 60 times - that Sidzikauskas had intimate relations with Miss Simonaitis, and it would be basically assumed that Miss Simonaitis could have also heard about his dealings in altogether secret matters. (C) wrote the last statement down.
- (2) (C) was asked by (C) if he could submit a copy of the memorandum by Skrajunas circulated in Lithuania or some other concrete evidence about that memorandum. The Americans know nothing about that memorandum, and had nothing to do with it. It would be very important to get a complete text from Lithuania, or least of all, get significant extracts of it. This point is so significant, that we ought to make every effort to get proof and deliver it to Sweden. (C) answered that he received knowledge of the memorandum and its text from Zymantas. (C) knows for sure that Zymantas does not have the complete text, and as for extracts, he is not sure. (C) promised to make an inquiry to Lithuania regarding the memorandum; on December 3 he asked Tarvydas about this through w/t.

b. (C) gave a brief on his discussions with the Americans: (RCL)

- (1) The Americans are very interested in having the Lithuanian executive unification come about as soon as possible. However, they are unable to indicate what changes should take place since they do not have the right to interfere in Lithuanian internal affairs. They can not favor any faction and must content themselves with declaration of

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their principal desire (unification). The position of the Americans is that the Lithuanian executive reorganization ought to come about within one year at the latest. From this context, I (presumably []) remarked that the neutrality or non-favoritism of the Americans would not require favoritism of any one faction if they withdrew their one-sided rendition of support. Otherwise, there was no neutrality.

- (2) The Americans explained to [] that after the loss of Skrajunas they have no w/t contacts with Lithuania. Also, the Americans made it clear that they are not going to send any more people to Lithuania.

b. [] ended his talk with [] with these conclusions:

- (1) After the aforementioned, the explanation of the Americans is "clear" since we here are the only ones who have w/t contact. Therefore, that strengthens our significance and position. Since the contact the TIEBARS have is rather weak, in the near future we will have to discuss how we can make it more effective and strengthen it.
- (2) [] stated that with regard to the Lithuanian activities abroad, executive leadership ought to be in the hands of one individual and not in collective hands. The executive authority should be Minister Lozoraitis (in setting forth this statement [] at times stated "in my opinion" and at times, "in our opinion".) It would be quite significant if Minister Lozoraitis would get in touch with the top man heading American direction as soon as possible. "In talking with these men in Munich there is no reward", because their influence and importance are very weak. Should such a meeting come about between Lozoraitis and the top (American) direction, and Lozoraitis' remarks be heard for or against union—[] hesitated to say more, since he is not thoroughly familiar with the ins and outs of our internal situation.

Stockholm, December 5, 1951

TIDYTIPS sent copies of the above to:

"Chief of Lithuanian Diplomatic Corps, S. Lozoraitis, and Professor Zymantas" (Zakevicius in Great Britain, presumably working for British Intelligence)

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